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CASE NOTES
Antitrust—Sherman Act—Coercive Price Fixing by Consignor.—Simp-
son v. Union Oil Co.'—Union Oil Company, a supplier of gasoline in eight
western states,2
 owned about 2000 stations which it leased to independent
retailers.° As a condition of obtaining or renewing a yearly lease, the inde-
pendent retailer had to sign a consignment agreement which provided that
Union would set the prices at which the independent retailer could sell the
gasoline. By the terms of the agreement, title to the gasoline was to remain
in Union until sold by the retailer-consignee, who was to receive a minimum
commission. Union was to pay all property taxes on all gasoline in the con-
signee's possession; the consignee, however, was to carry personal liability
and property damage insurance and was to assume the risk for all losses
of the consigned gasoline, except those caused by specified acts of nature.
When Simpson, a consignee, sold gasoline below the price fixed by Union,
Union refused to renew his lease. Simpson brought suit, claiming that the one
year lease, coupled with the consignment agreement, constituted coercive
price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.4 The Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California granted Union's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Simpson had neither shown illegal price fixing nor
suffered any actionable damage.° The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed on the limited ground that Simpson had suffered no action-
able wrong or damage.° The United States Supreme Court, in reversing and
remanding for a hearing on all other issues including the issue of damages,
HELD: The consignment agreement, coupled with the threat of non-renewal
of the one year lease, was a coercive price fixing arrangement, and thus
illegal under the Sherman Act.
This decision has far-reaching significance since similar consignment-
lease agreements are widespread throughout the gasoline industry?
The Court held the consignment agreement illegal because of the
coercion Union employed by means of the combination of the lease with
the agreement to sell at fixed prices. A parallel was drawn to the resale price
maintenance scheme struck down in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 8
1 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
2 The
 eight states are California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, Montana,
Utah and Idaho.
3 The Union Oil Company supplied gasoline to 4,133 retail stations; 2,003 of these
were owned and leased by Union and, in turn, leased or subleased to an independent
retailer. Union Oil as of the date of this action had consignment agreements with 1,978
(99%) of the retailer-lessees.
4 The action was brought under 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958), alleging
violation of 50 Stat. 639 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) and 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
2 (1958).
5 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 69936 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
6 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
7 Petition of Union Oil Company for Rehearing, p. 2.
8 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 687 (1964) for a detailed
discussion of this case and the problems of resale price maintenance.
318
CASE NOTES
In that case, there was no consignment agreement; a manufacturer sold drugs
outright to wholesalers and retailers. No price fixing arrangements were made,
but representatives of the manufacturer (personally) visited the wholesalers
and retailers and told them that the manufacturer would refuse to deal with
them if they sold below a certain price. The wholesalers were further told
that the manufacturer would refuse to deal with them if they sold to retailers
who sold below the minimum price. The Court found that, with respect to
the retailers, the manufacturer's program amounted to more than a simple
refusal to deal; it amounted to coercion since the wholesalers were being
enlisted to "effectuate the retailers' adherence to the suggested retail prices."9
If the Court in Simpson had found that the gasoline was sold by Union and
purchased by Simpson, that is, that the consignment agreement was really a
sham since possession and most of the attendant risks rested in the consignee,
then Parke, Davis would have been clear precedent for holding that the threat
of non-renewal of the lease was illegal coercion designed to achieve resale
price maintenance. Certainly the coercive element was stronger in Simpson
than it was in Parke, Davis; in the former case the consignee was threatened
with loss of his entire business, whereas in the latter the dealers were threat-
ened only with loss of a particular line of goods. But the Court says clearly
that the agreement was a true consignment agreement, that title to the gas-
oline remained in the oiI company until sold to the ultimate consumer, and
that there was no sale. Nevertheless, the Court held that the agreement was
for resale price maintenance, coercively implemented and thus illegal.° Said
the Court, ". . . A consignment is not allowed to be used as a cloak to avoid
§ 3 of the Clayton Act."'l
In striking down the consignment agreement in Simpson, the Court was
forced to consider United States v. General Elec. Co., 12 a case in which a
similar consignment agreement was upheld. This case was not overruled but
distinguished on the ground that the product involved, lamp bulbs, was
patented.' 8 The Court stated that the holder of a patent had the right under
such patent to fix the prices at which the article could be sold." The Court
might also have distinguished the cases on the ground that the element of
coercion was missing in General Electric.
The Court pointed out that it was not holding all consignment agree-
ments illegal." It was only outlawing the use of the consignment device as
a means of coercively maintaining a vast system of fixed prices. Thus it
would appear that in the future the law of resale price maintenance in the
area of consignment agreements will not differ greatly from that governing
purchase and sale agreements. In the area of purchase and sale agreements,
9 Id. at 46.
10 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., supra note 1, at 24.
11 Id. at 18.
12 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
13 In his dissent in Simpson, Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that in General Electric
the Court gave no intimation that its conclusion upholding a consignment agreement
under the Sherman Act would have differed in any respect if the consigned article had
not been patented. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., supra note 1, at 27-28.
14 Id. at 24.
15 Id. at 23.
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a manufacturer who simply refuses to deal with a retailer selling below a
minimum price does not act illegally." As Parke, Davis points out, it is only
when the manufacturer applies coercion above and beyond the simple refusal
to deal that illegality arises. However, it should be noted that courts have
not been at a loss to find the necessary coercion. 17 In view of this and the
holding in the present case, it would appear that if , there is any element of
coercion used to enforce prices fixed by a consignment agreement, the courts
will find a violation of the Sherman Act.
It is difficult, however, to conceive of a consignment agreement covering
many retailers in which a court could not detect coercive measures. Indeed,
even if a legal, non-coercive agreement could be drafted, it would invite
expensive litigation. Therefore, it would seem that gasoline suppliers will in
the future have to depend upon competition to maintain steady prices or
else operate their own stations with their own employees. The latter solution
appears to be preferrable in light of United States v. Standard Oil Co." where
the government noted that gasoline companies have the right to operate their
own stations and to sell in them any products they manufacture or distribute.
DWIGHT W. MILLER
Corporations—Fiduciary Duty of Director of Full and Frank Dis-
closure in Adversary Proceedings.—Alleghany v. Kirby.'—In December,
1949, Kirby, president of the Alleghany Corporation, and three other officers
and directors voted to exchange their personally held shares of Alleghany
preferred stock for Alleghany's holdings of Investment Diversified Services,
Inc. (IDS). Kirby transferred his Alleghany stock to Alleghany for 24,062
shares of IDS priced at slightly over $8. In 1954 the IDS stock had risen to
$200 per share and Kirby had profited by more than $4,500,000. Several suits
were brought against Kirby and others in state and federal courts in 1954-
1955 by stockholders of Alleghany. Ten of these suits were consolidated under
the title, Zenn v. Anzalone. 2 The consolidated complaint alleged a conspiracy
by Kirby and others to enrich themselves at the expense of Alleghany and
fraudulently to induce the stockholders to ratify such acts by misrepresent-
ing the financial picture of IDS in proxy statements used at the stock-
holders' meeting of May 3, 1950. The focal point of the Zenn suit was
the IDS stock deal and the inside knowledge of the defendants concerning
the enormous prospective increase in earnings of IDS.
A settlement stipulation was drafted in July, 1955. After notice was given
to all stockholders, a referee began a hearing on the merits of the fairness
and adequacy of the settlement, which was, in effect, a hearing on the merits
18 Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
17 See 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 687 supra note 8 for some conditions relied on
by the courts to find this element of coercion.
18 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
1 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 17 Misc.2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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